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Africa has become synonymous with war, population dislocations, humanitarian crises, famines
and a perpetual state of despair. During the 1966-86 period, no African country suffered more
than Uganda. According to numerous human rights organizations, it is likely that state-inspired
violence claimed more than one million lives and destroyed the political, economic and social
fabric of the society. In 1981, 27 Ugandans, led by Yoweri Museveni, took to the bush to fight
for an end to this carnage and for the creation of a new, more stable Uganda. The story of
Musevenis war is one of the most important chapters of Africas post-independence military
history. 
The three books discussed in this review essay provide a comprehensive assessment of the
conflict and its impact on contemporary Uganda. Musevenis Long March is the only available
soldiers account of how Musevenis National Resistance Army (NRA) (later renamed the Uganda
Peoples Defence Force) overthrew the regime of Milton Obote (1980-85) and Tito Okello (1985-
86). The author, who died in 1995, joined the NRA in 1982, serving initially in the medical unit
and then in the political unit. 
Apart from providing a useful narrative account of military operations, Ondoga analyzes the
NRAs strategy, tactics, capabilities and ideology. He also dispels many myths about the war. For
example, he discounts the theory that those who joined the NRA acted out of a desire to establish
a democratic form of government. Instead, the author argues that the yearning for physical
survival forced us into the bush. This explains why Museveni initially based his guerrilla
campaign in the Luwero Triangle, an area north of the Kampala that had been ravaged by
government troops, many of whom were Acholi. 
Ondoga believes that the armed forces have a vital role to play in Ugandas political development.
In particular, he argues that the army must be part of an ongoing revolution to dismantle and
recreate all state components, including the army, police, intelligence services, prison services,
government bureaucracy and the judiciary. Such ideological determinism is at variance with
Ugandas reputation of being a open, pragmatic society. Although the depth to which Odongos
thinking permeates the military is unknown, it is likely that many officers believe that the army
can at least help to lead Uganda into the twenty-first century. 
The Anguish of Northern Uganda is the first comprehensive study of this conflict which has
claimed tens of thousands of lives and has consumed ever increasing amounts of the
governments budget. The author, under contract to the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) mission in Kampala, conducted considerable field research by traveling
some 5,000 kilometers in northern Uganda and interviewing about 300 people, the majority of
whom lived in the war zone. He also consulted with diplomats from seven countries and
representatives from the United Nations, other multilateral organizations and various religious
groups. 
Gersonys study has many strengths, the most important of which is the clear explanation of the
intricacies of the norths relationship to the rest of Uganda. In the northeastern districts of Gulu
and Kitgum, the Acholi people have a centuries-old warrior tradition that has given them a
unique place in Ugandan history. During the pre-colonial, colonial and post-independence
periods, Acholis earned a reputation for their prowess as soldiers, policemen and prison guards. 
Idi Amin (1971-79), who is from West Nile District in northwestern Uganda, purged the armed
forces of the Acholis and replaced them with West Nilers like the Kakwa and Aringa people and
with Sudanese who had been long-time residents in Uganda. By the early 1980s, however, the
Acholi influence in the military rebounded and they constituted approximately 30-40 percent of
the armed forces and dominated the officer corps. 
During the fight against the insurgent NRA, the author documents how Acholi soldiers
committed widespread atrocities against the civilian population of the Luwero Triangle. After
Museveni seized power in January 1986, Acholi troops fled to their traditional homeland in
northeast Uganda or to exile in southern Sudan. 
Since then, warfare between the Acholis and the NRA has plagued Gulu and Kitgum Districts.
Gersony provides an excellent analysis of the evolution of this conflict. He also dispels the
popular notion that the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) (earlier known as the Holy Spirit
Movement), which has been dominated by mystics like Alice Auma (aka Lakwena) and Joseph
Kony, represents little more than a degeneration into primitive atavism. 
In the authors view, the war has passed through five distinct stages, each of which he examines in
detail. He points out that during the initial stages of the insurgency, most Acholis backed the
rebels. However, popular support waned as the LRA became more abusive toward the civilian
population. Gersony cautions that the increasing unpopularity of the rebels should not be
misconstrued as support for Musevenis regime, which is viewed negatively by the majority of
Acholis. 
The next section of The Anguish of Northern Uganda deals with the conflict in West Nile
District. The author shows how Sudan facilitated the emergence of the insurgent West Nile Bank
Front (WNBF) - which was led by Juma Oris, a former minister in the Amin government - by
exploiting local resentment against the Museveni government, especially among the large
numbers of unemployed former soldiers and youth. Additionally, many West Nilers believed that
Kampala had exacerbated the security situation by allowing the Sudanese Peoples Liberation
Army (SPLA) led by John Garang to establish bases in northwest Uganda. The level of fighting
in northwestern Uganda has been far less destructive than Konys activities in Gulu and Kitgum
districts. According to Gersony, there are several reasons for the difference between the two rebel
groups. He explains that, although there was some minor unrest in the early 1990s, it was not
until 1994 that the WNBF emerged as a credible guerrilla force. Unlike the LRA, the WNBF has
not brutalized the civilian population or attacked civilian targets such as schools. Also,
dislocation of civilians has been minimal while the material impact of the war has been only a
fraction of that in Acholi areas. As a result, many communities in the northwest supported or at
least tolerated WNBF activities. 
Gersony concludes his study with a comprehensive set of recommendations to end the fighting in
northern Uganda. Sadly, by early 1999, neither Washington nor Kampala had tried to implement
any of the authors suggestions. 
Sowing the Mustard Seed has a pronounced tendency toward long-windedness and hagiographic
pretentiousness. Nevertheless, Musevenis autobiography is indispensable for understanding
Musevenis war of liberation, his efforts to transform the NRA into a conventional military force
and his failure to end the insurgency in northern Uganda. 
Nine out of fourteen chapters are devoted to military matters. Apart from providing an
appreciation of Musevenis military strategy and tactics, the book is filled with highly factual
information. The author focuses largely on the building blocks of a successful guerrilla war.
These include the ability to smuggle arms, conduct successful ambushes, infiltrate rebels into
government-controlled areas and then conceal them, disseminate propaganda, and win the hearts
and minds of local populations. Much of this information is unavailable elsewhere. 
Additionally, Sowing the Mustard Seed contains material about the post-1986 period and the
difficulties of trying to transform a guerrilla force into a conventional army, the requirements of
an effective demobilization program and the problems associated with waging a
counterinsurgency war in northern Uganda. Museveni also pontificates about the role of the army
and the ruling-party, known as the movement, in recreating a functioning state, establishing order
and restoring the rule of law. 
On a broader level, Sowing the Mustard Seed raises the inevitable question about how Museveni,
who was such a masterful guerrilla leader, has proven to be such an inept commander-in-chief.
The military situation is worse now than at anytime since he came to power. Gross corruption
plagues all levels of the UPDF. There are more active insurgent groups in northern and western
Uganda than ever before. Musevenis Combined Arms Element counterinsurgency strategy, which
calls for the use of heavy weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopter gun ships
and fighter aircraft, has been a dismal failure. Apart from lacking the capabilities and personnel
to operate and maintain such equipment, command and control is nebulous at best. The growing
cost of Ugandas military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC)
threatens to derail development programs and alienate donors who want to reduce military
spending. Acknowledging and resolving these problems requires a circumspect and capable
personality rather than one imbued with an exaggerated sense of military infallibility. 
Since these three books were published, the military situation in Uganda has deteriorated. In
western Uganda, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) - it is comprised of Ugandan Muslims;
remnants of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) that had been active in the
Ruwenzori mountains during the early 1990s; and, reportedly, former soldiers from Rwanda and
the DROC - has scored some major victories but lacks the power to deliver a decisive military
victory over Uganda. The Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) has started minor
operations in northeast Uganda while the UPDF has deployed some units to eastern Uganda in
response to growing unrest. Meanwhile, the UPDFs intervention in the DROC, which has lasted
far longer than expected, continues to consume ever increasing amounts of Ugandan resources.
Recently, there were reports of clashes between the UPDF and its ally, the Rwanda Patriotic
Army, in eastern DROC. 
Despite these growing problems, Museveni refuses to negotiate with any of the rebel groups,
preferring instead to seek a military victory over his adversaries. However, his repeated threats to
crush the insurgents have failed to produce any tangible results. Musevenis dirty little wars,
coupled with the DROC fiasco, provides little hope that stability will be restored to Uganda
anytime soon. 
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